

Republic of the Marshall Islands

MARITIME ADMINISTRATOR

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SHIP SECURITY ADVISORY No. 07-25 (Rev. 1)

To: Owners/Operators, Masters, Company Security Officers, Recognized Security Organizations

Subject: THREATS TO SHIPPING AMID THE UNITED STATES / ISRAEL / IRAN CONFLICT

Date: 25 June 2025

1.0 Updates

- 1.1 As the ceasefire between Iran and Israel has held for the past 24-hours, and multiple United States (US)-affiliated ships have transited the Strait of Hormuz (SoH) region without incident, the ship security level has now been lowered back to **Security Level 2** for all vessels transiting the SoH region.

2.0 Background

- 2.1 The Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI) Maritime Administrator (the “Administrator”) is working in close coordination with Shipping Industry Associations, United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO), Maritime Security Center Indian Ocean (MSCIO), and the Joint Maritime Information Center ([JMIC](#)) to aid in the development of unified guidance during the current US / Israel / Iran conflict. The JMIC will continue to publish [daily advisory updates](#) on the situation.
- 2.2 Company Security Officers should already be receiving JMIC advisories via email from UKMTO, but they are also posted on the [UKMTO](#) and [MSCIO](#) websites. To join the UKMTO mailing list, please send a request to info@ukmto.org.
- 2.3 This advisory should be read in conjunction with Ship Security Advisory (SSA) No. [05-24](#), SSA No. [01-25](#), and SSA No. [03-25](#).

This SSA is evaluated annually by the Administrator and expires one year after its issuance or renewal unless otherwise noted, superseded, or revoked.

3.0 Electronic Interference and Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) Jamming or Spoofing

3.1 Extensive electronic interference has been reported in the SoH region. This interference is likely originating in Bandar Abbas, Iran for the purpose of protecting Iran from incoming missiles. However, it also has the unintended consequence of interfering with the safe navigation of merchant ships in the region.

3.2 JMIC Advice:

- .1 *Closely monitor all electronic aids and communication networks for electronic interference. Be ready with alternative options should navigation aids fail.*
- .2 *With reports of automatic identification system (AIS) spoofing and extreme jamming in the SoH and the wider Arabian Gulf, JMIC recommends that ships are ready to navigate via alternative means (radar/visual, fixes/charts, etc.) and closely watch the gyro compasses as these are also being impacted (due to Global Positioning System (GPS) latitude correction feed).*

3.3 Supplemental Advice for the SoH Region:

- .1 Navigate using terrestrial and dead reckoning methods. Where possible, utilize parallel index lines on radar and radar overlay onto Electronic Chart Display and Information System (ECDIS) to affirm vessel position and increase dead reckoning position fixing frequencies.
- .2 If interference is evident, consider disconnecting ECDIS from the GPS completely and use it as a chart to plot visual and radar fixes.
- .3 Consider turning off the AIS overlay feature on radar and ECDIS units to avoid confusion.
- .4 Do not trust AIS positions of other vessels due to potential spoofing of navigation systems. Remember that surrounding vessels are also impacted.
- .5 Be aware that heavy traffic may build up in the effected region if all vessels choose to transit during daylight hours.
- .6 Maintain a safe distance from other vessels, particularly if not emitting AIS.
- .7 Use manual steering if necessary.
- .8 Review the [INTERTANKO paper](#) on GNSS jamming and spoofing.
- .9 Report any incidents of electronic interference and GNSS jamming or spoofing to [UKMTO](#).

4.0 Regulatory Guidance

4.1 AIS

In accordance with the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, regulation V/34-1, “Masters shall not be prevented from using professional judgement to make decisions necessary for safety of life at sea and protection of the marine environment.” Master’s discretion includes the ability to switch off the vessel’s AIS if it is assessed that doing so will reduce threats to vessel safety or security (refer to §22 of International Maritime Organization (IMO) Assembly [Resolution A.1106\(29\)](#))

4.2 Use of Power Reserve

If the Master decides to override the shaft power limitation (SHaPoLi) or engine power limitation (EPL) system, where fitted for compliance with relevant MARPOL Annex VI regulations, for the safety and security of the ship, then owners/operators must comply with the reporting requirements detailed in RMI Marine Notice [2-013-12](#), §3.2.3.

4.3 Additional Precautions

- .1 Vessels with links to Israel or the US (i.e., owner, operator, manager, charterer, cargo)) are advised to transit the Southern Red Sea or SoH regions with a high degree of caution and vigilance. This includes the Southern Red Sea (south of 18 degrees north), Bab-el-Mandeb, Gulf of Aden, Arabian Sea, Gulf of Oman, SoH, and Arabian/Persian Gulf.
- .2 Follow the Maritime Security Transit Corridor - SoH ([MSTC-SoH](#)) routing guidance published by Shipping Industry Associations.
- .3 Ensure ready access to the [JMIC Bridge Emergency Reference Cards](#).
- .4 Avoid Iranian territorial waters.
- .5 Review and implement Industry Best Management Practices for Maritime Security ([BMP-MS](#)).
- .6 Implement contingency planning covering crew welfare, rerouting, emergency response, and speed adjustments.
- .7 Maintain vigilant lookouts for unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), unmanned surface vessels, floating mines, and fast-approaching craft.

- .8 In the event of a UAV or projectile sighting, ensure the crew are briefed and gather in the designated Safe Muster Point (SMP). The SMP should be within the superstructure, and above the waterline. Also reference the Oil Companies International Marine Forum (OCIMF) publications entitled [*Loitering Munitions – the Threat to Merchant Ships*](#) and [*Ship Security: Hull Vulnerability Study*](#).
- .9 Limpet mines may be attached to merchant vessels in the SoH region. While there is currently no known threat, enhanced oversight checks are advised, particularly at anchor.
- .10 Immediately report any incidents or suspicious activity to [UKMTO](#) and the Administrator. A full list of contact details can be found in *Global Maritime Security Contacts* ([MARSEC-210](#)).